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I. INTRODUCTION
To understand the Commission of the European Community's
[hereinafter Commission] approach to joint ventures under article
85 of the Treaty of Rome,' it is first necessary to analyze the
Commission's competition policy and, then, to determine whether
that policy is reflected in the Commission's decisions concerning
joint venture agreements.
II. THE COMNIISSION'S COMPETITION POLICY
The purposes of the European Economic Community's (EEC)
competition rules have been identified as: (1) the prevention of
barriers to trade being erected by private agreements between
undertakings, abuse of monopoly power, or state subsidies; (2) the
maintenance of effective competition as the spur to the creation of
a single market; and (3) the encouragement of efficiency,
innovation, and lower prices.'
In its First Report, the Commission pointed out that:
Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since
it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all.
An active competition policy pursued in accordance with
the provisions of the Treaties establishing the Communities
makes it easier for the supply and demand structures
continually to adjust to technological development. Through
the interplay of decentralized decision-making machinery,
competition enables enterprises continuously to improve
their efficiency, which is the sine qua non condition for a
steady improvement in living standards and employment
prospects within the countries of the Community.3
1. Treaty Establishing a European Economic Community, 2 U.N.T.S. 294-97; 1-3 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) "1 100-5406.
2. CHRISTOPmR BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHmD, COMMON MARK" LAW OF COMPETTON
§ 1-025, at 14 (3d ed. 1987).
3. First Report on Competition Pofy Introduction, 2 EEC Competition L Rep. (MB) 1407
(1971).
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According to the Commission, the main advantages of a
competition policy are: (1) it endeavors to maintain or create
effective conditions of competition by means of rules applying to
enterprises; (2) it encourages the best possible use of productive
resources for the greatest possible benefit of the economy as a
whole, and for the benefit of the consumer; (3) it is a mean of
fighting inflation; and (4) it contributes considerably to the better
use of labor, since ill adjusted structures which are encouraged by
inflation give rise to underutilization of the labor potential within
the Community and to underpayment of skilled workers.4
The first objective of competition is, according to the
Commission, to prevent governmental restrictions and barriers,
which have been abolished, from being replaced by similar
measures of a private nature. Therefore, a competition policy must
ensure fair competition so that enterprises operating within the
Common Market can, in general, benefit from the same conditions
of competition.5
Consequently, the following types of arrangements are
considered a serious threat to the achievement of the Commission's
objectives.6  First among these suspect arrangements is
market-sharing arrangements and quotas. "The direct object and
result of [market-sharing arrangement and quota] implementation
is to eliminate the exchange of goods between the Member States
concerned.", 7 Second among these suspect arrangements is
price-fixing. "[A]greements to fix prices and to protect national
markets are mutually complimentary and constitute, therefore, an
obstacle to trade since they prevent buyers from benefiting from
the competitive market conditions which would have prevailed, had
there been no such agreements." 8 Third among these suspect
arrangements is joint selling agreements.
4. /,. at 1408.
5. Id. at 1409.
6. See generally id. pt. One, ch. 1, § 1, I 1-24, at 1419-36.
7. Id. 2, at 1420.
8. First Report on Competition Polcy pt. One, ch. 1, § 1, 16, 2 EEC Competition L Rep.
(MB) at 1423-24.
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The producers allocate among themselves, in predetermined
proportions, the total quantity of products to be sold and
offer these products on the market through their joint
selling agency at uniform prices and conditions of sale..
. .[This prevents] competition among the members of the
group who have, therefore, neither the incentive nor the
capability to develop individual selling activities for their
products at prices freely determined according to quantity
and destination. At the same time, buyers are deprived of a
choice between several sources of supply and have no way
of stimulating price competition among different
producers. 9
Conversely, the Commission's policy encourages cooperation
between enterprises. "[T]his can produce favourable economic
results and maintain effective competition within the Common
Market." 10 Cooperation has been achieved through block
exemptions and individual exemptions, which are especially
important in the case of joint ventures.
III. APPUCABrrY oF ARTICLE 85 TO JOiNT VENTURES
In light of the above considerations concerning the
Commission's competition policy, it appears clear that cooperation
between enterprises infringe article 85 when it has as its object or
effect, the restriction of competition within the Common Market,
or may affect trade between member states.
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits, subject to the
possibility of an exemption under article 85(3), all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by association of undertakings, or
concerted practices, which are likely to affect trade between
member states and which have the object or effect of preventing,
restraining, or distorting competition within the Common Market.
In the case of joint ventures, among the conduct prohibited by
article 85, the following are particularly relevant: (1) to directly or
9. Id. 11, at 1427.
10. Id 25, at 1437.
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indirectly fix buying or selling prices or other trade terms; (2) to
limit or control production, marketing, technical development, or
investments; (3) to allocate markets or sources of supply; and (4)
to apply to trade partners unequal conditions in respect of
equivalent transactions, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage.
Specifically, joint ventures infringe upon article 85, if they have
as their object, or result in: (1) allocation of geographical or
product markets or sources of supply; (2) restrictions on producing
or marketing competing products; (3) restrictions on the possibility
of making independent investments or carrying out independent
technological researches; (4) restrictions on the possibility of
independently granting technological licenses; and (5) restrictions
concerning the utilization of labels and trademarks on jointly
manufactured products.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETwEEN COOPERATIVE AND
CONCENTRATIVE JOINT VENTURES
The distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint
ventures is relevant to the applicability of article 85 of the Treaty
of Rome and Regulation 4064/89 Regarding the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings."1 In cooperative joint
ventures, the risk of restricting competition is almost inevitable
since a coordination of the economic activities of the participants
usually takes place, whereby competition is restricted or distorted.
In concentrative joint ventures, it is theoretically possible that no
coordination of competition between parents or between the parents
and subsidiary occurs.
Concentrative and cooperative joint ventures have been deeply
analyzed by the Commission in some of its decisions concerning
joint ventures and, eventually, in its Notice on the Application of
11. Regulation 4064/89 of Dec. 21, 1989, art. 3, 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, 4.
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Regulation 4064/89 (concerning concentrations in undertakings) to
joint ventures. 2
In the Notice on the Application of Regulation 4064/89
[hereinafter Notice], the Commission pointed out that "the
Regulation does not deal with operations . . . [which] are
cooperative in character." 13 Such operations are defined as those
"whose object or effect is the coordination of the competitive
activities of undertakings that remain independent of each
other. ' ,1 4 Where an "operation . . . includes both a lasting
structural change and the coordination of competitive behavior,"
and the two are inseparable, the operation should be regarded as
cooperative.15 On the other hand, "[i]f the structural change can
be separated from the coordination of competitive behaviour, the
former will be assessed under the Regulation and the latter, to the
extent that it does not amount to an ancillary restriction within the
meaning of Article 8(2), second subparagraph of the Regulation,
12. Commission Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064189 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 10 (English ed.) [hereinafter Regulation 4064/89]. See Dr.
Werner Kleinmann, Die Anwendbarkeir der EG-Fusionskontrollverordnung auf
Gemeinschafisunternehmen, RECHT DER INTERNAIONAL.N WIRTSCHAFr 605 (1990); Dr. Rainer
Bechtold, Die Grundzge der neuen EWG-Fusionskontrolle, RECHT DER INTERNAIONALEN
WiRTscHAFr 256 (1990); Dr. Karsten Schmidt, Europdische Fusionskontroie im System des Rechts
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, BffRiEns-BERAnTE 719 (1990); Dr. Horst Satzky, New EEC
Antitrust Regime for Joint Ventures, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW. 518 (1990); Trevor Soames, Merger
Control in the United Kingdom: Recent Developments, 18 INT'L Bus. LAw. 313 (1990); James S.
Venit, The "Merger" Control Regulation: Europe Comes ofAge...or Caliban's Dinner, 27 CoMMoN
Mcr. L REv. 7 (1990); Alexander, Le Contrde Des Concentrations Entre Entreprises, CAmmts DE
DRorr EuRoP N529 (1990); John Cook & Trevor Soames, EEC Merger Regulation: A Practical
View, 19 INT'L BUS. LAw. 330 (1991); Dr. Hans-J6rg Niemeyer, Die Anwendbarkeit derArt 85 und
86 EWG-Vertrag auf Unternehmenszusammenschlfisse nach Inkrafttreten der
EG.Fusionskontrollverordnung, REC=T DER INTERNArONALtEN WincrHAFr 448 (1991) (regarding
the application of Regulation 4064/89 to joint ventures).
13. Regulation 4064189, supra note 12, pt. 1, 1, at 10.
14. Id
15. Id It has been observed that the difficulty of defining joint ventures covered by the
Regulation derives from the ambivalent nature of many joint ventures because, "[w]hile the
'horizontal' relationship between the parent companies may contain elements of anti-competitive
arrangement, the 'vertical' relationship between the parent companies and the subsidiary may have
the features of a merger." Satzky, supra note 12, at 519.
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[will] be assessed under the other Regulations implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty." 6
V. THE COMMISSION's NOTICE ON THE APPLICATION
OF REGULATION 4064/89 TO JOINT VENTURES
According to the Notice, "[t]o define the term 'joint venture'.
, it is necessary to refer to" article 3(1)(b) of Regulation
4064/89.17 Under that regulation, the term refers to "undertakings
that are jointly controlled by several other undertakings." 18 "Joint
control may be provided for in the [joint venture]'s constitution.
. . , but [it] may also be established later," as is the case when a
holding in an existing undertaking is acquired. It may also be based
on agreements or concertations between the parent companies.'9
In addition, it should be noted that pursuant to article 3(2) of
Regulation 4064/89, the conditions required for a joint venture to
amount to a concentration are: (1) that it permanently exercise all
the functions of an autonomous economic firm, and (2) that it does
not have-for object or effect-the coordination of competition
among the parent companies, or between them and the joint
venture.
20
According to the Commission's Notice, a joint venture must act
as an independent supplier and buyer on the market in order to
fulfill the first condition. 21 "This is not the case where [a joint
venture] supplies its products or services exclusively to its parent
companies, or when it meets its own needs wholly from them.", 22
The elements supporting the existence of a joint venture on a
lasting basis are the agreed duration and, especially, that the human
and material resources of the joint venture are such as to "ensure
16. Regulation 4064/89, supra note 12, pt. 1, 11, at 10. See Commission Notice Regarding
Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 5.
17. Regulation 4064189, supra note 12, pt. ILA, 17, at 10.
18. lot
19. Id. pt. II.A3, I 11, at 11.
20. Id pt. 11, 16, at 10.
21. Id pt. I.B.1, 16, at 11.
22. Id
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the [joint venture]'s existence and independence in the long
term."'  For this purpose, transfer of know-how or of existing
undertakings or business, or investment of financial resources may
be specifically relevant.24 Conversely, the autonomous nature of
a joint venture is weakened if, for its business, it depends on
facilities which remain completely with the parent companies'
business.'
As to the second condition laid down by article 3(2) of
Regulation 4064/89 (viz: that the joint venture has, as neither its
object or effect, the coordination of competition among the parent
companies or between them and the joint venture), the Notice
denies the existence of any foreseeable competition, if "all the
parent companies withdraw entirely and permanently from the
[joint venture]'s market and do not operate" on neighboring,
upstream, or downstream markets.26 Where the parent companies'
preexisting activities have been transferred to the joint venture, the
risk of coordination should be excluded, if the whole of certain
business activities have been transferred to the joint venture, and
the parent companies "withdraw permanently from the [joint
venture]'s market so that they remain neither actual nor potential
competitors .... 27
Coordination of competition between the joint venture and the
parent companies has been inferred by the Commission, even in the
absence of any express covenant, from the circumstances of the
transaction. Such circumstances include: (1) the obligation for each
of the parent companies to grant the joint venture a license for any
inventions achieved individually (such an obligation was held to
make it impossible for each parent company to acquire an
advantage on the other party with respect to the results achieved
through its own research);28 (2) whether all important decisions
concerning the joint venture's activity required the agreement of
23. Id pt. .B., 1 17, at 12.
24. Id
25. Id pt. 1H.B.1, 116, at 11-12.
26. Id pL I.B.2, i 20, at 12.
27. Id pt. H.B.2, 1 25, at 13.
28. Commission Decision of Dec. 23, 1971 (HenkelColgate), 1972 OJ. (L 14) 14.
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the parent companies (which owned respectively 50% of the joint
venture's stock);2 9 (3) the existence of exclusive distribution
agreements between the parents and the joint venture;3" (4) the
restriction on the ability of the parties to freely license their
technology to third parties in the joint venture's market;31 (5) the
joint investments of the parents in such amounts as to restrict the
possibility of independent investments;32 (6) the ban on the
parents to utilize the know-how transferred to the joint venture, in
the event of their withdrawal;33 and (7) the existence of an
exclusive purchase agreement between the joint venture and one of
the parents.34
VI. WHEN A JOINT VENTURE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A
CONCENTRATION: THE COMMISSION'S ANALYSIS
PRIOR TO THE NOTICE
The Notice is the result of the Commission's evaluation of joint
ventures in its previous case law. Therefore, the views expressed
in the Notice can be better understood in light of Commission's
previous decisions.
In the SHV/Chevron case,35 the conclusion that the planned
joint venture would amount to a concentration was based on the
following circumstances: (1) a lasting change in the structures of
the parents companies (this was found in the permanent transfer of
all assets and distribution networks to the joint venture); and (2)
the withdrawal of the parents from the joint venture's market, with
the likelihood of never returning.
29. Commission Decision of July 25, 1977 (De Laval-Stork), 1977 OJ. (L 215) 11.
30. Commission Decision of July 20, 1988 (SopelemlVickers), 1988 OJ. (L230) 39;see infra
part XIV (discussing Sopelem/Vickers).
31. Commission Decision of July 13, 1983 (Rockwelylveco), 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19.
32. Id.
33. Commission Decision of Dec. 8, 1983 (Carbon Gas Teclmology), 1983 O.J (L 376) 17.
34. Commission Decision of July 20, 1988 (IvecolFord), 1988 OJ. (L 230) 39; see infra part
X (discussing Iveco/Ford).
35. Commission Decision of 20 December 1974, 1975 OJ. (L 38) 14; see infra part VI
(discussing the case).
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However, in the Iveco/Ford case,36 the transfer by Ford U.K.,
to a newly created common subsidiary, of the equipment and
related personnel necessary to manufacture certain vehicles, was
not considered sufficient to justify the conclusion that Ford U.K.
would disappear from the joint venture's market. Ford U.K. would
remain part of the market because, even if Ford U.K. had waived
the possibility of manufacturing such vehicles in Europe, it would
continue manufacturing them in the U.S., and could export to
Europe.
Also, in the Enichem/ICI case, 7 the dedication by the parents,
to a jointly owned subsidiary, of the entire capacity of their plants
was not considered sufficient to regard the operation as a
concentration, since the parents would retain the ownership of such
plants. The Commission also stressed that the parents would be
able to reenter the product market transferred to the joint venture,
since they would remain active in the upstream market.
In De Lava4/Stork, the Commission held that a joint venture
could not be regarded as a concentration because after the
agreement, the parent companies would not become mere holdings,
thereby withdrawing completely and definitely from the joint
venture's market. According to the Commission, such a withdrawal
would have required that the parents had no longer maintained the
possibility of independently returning into the joint venture's
market.
SHV-Chevron
SHV-Chevron concerned a network of joint ventures for the
distribution of petroleum derivatives between
Steenkolen-Handelsvereeniging NV (SHV), Utrecht, and Chevron
Oil Europe Inc. [hereinafter Chevron], incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware, with its head office in New York, U.S.
The main points of the agreements included the following: (1)
under the cooperation agreement, Chevron and SHV would set up
36. See infra part X (discussing the case).
37. See infra part XII (discussing the case).
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a joint holding company incorporated under the laws of the
Netherlands, called "Calpam NV," as well as jointly and equally
owned subsidiaries, also called "Calpam," for the purpose of
selling the products covered by the agreements in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, and Denmark, where Chevron
and SHV had independent distribution networks; (2) they would
vest in the Calpam subsidiaries for at least fifty years their
distribution networks and all the assets relating thereto (such as,
plants and equipment); (3) the object of the general cooperation
agreement, and the specific agreements forming a Calpam
subsidiary for each country, included (except in Germany) paraffin
oil (kerosene), household fuel, industrial fuel, asphalt, marine fuels,
and lubricating oils; (4) the Calpam joint subsidiaries would be
supplied by the various subsidiaries of Chevron under nonexclusive
supply contracts; (5) for the petroleum products listed above, which
would be distributed by the joint subsidiaries, the signatory
companies each agreed not to compete against the other without the
prior consent of the other; and (6) the price of the asphalt sold by
the Calpam subsidiaries would be fixed by Chevron.
The Commission observed that: (1) the agreements would bring
a lasting change in the structures of the companies involved and
above all in that of SHV; (2) SHV would cease to do business as
an independent wholesale buyer of petroleum products; (3) SHV
and Chevron would cease to retail the relevant products separately;
(4) most of the other aspects of the agreement suggested that the
distribution side of Chevron and SHV's business would be
integrated into the new trading structure of the Calpam subsidiaries;
(5) the Calpam subsidiaries were formed for a period lasting until
December 31, 2019, thus suggesting that the assets in question
would to be transferred permanently to the Calpam subsidiaries; (6)
for both Chevron and SHV, this would bring about a real
concentration between each of them and their joint subsidiaries,
confined to the distribution of the products specified by the
agreement; (7) the cooperation agreement contained no clause
restricting competition between Chevron and SHV in areas other
than those covered by the Calpam joint subsidiaries; (8)
considering the distribution of the products covered by the
260
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agreement, Chevron and SIV had agreed not to compete without
the prior consent of the other, this would involve no appreciable
restriction of competition since Chevron had no industrial or
commercial interest which could imaginably lead it to compete
with its own 50%-owned subsidiaries; and (9) SIV would
disappear as an independent wholesaler on the petroleum product
market, with no likelihood of ever returning.
The operation was therefore regarded as a concentration, which did
not infringe article 85, so that a negative clearance was granted
pursuant to article 2 of Regulation 17.
VII. CASES CONSIDERED NOT TO VIOLATE ARTICLE 85
FOR OTHER REASONS
In two cases, the conclusion that the proposed transaction did
not violate article 85 was not based on the question of whether the
joint venture would amount to a concentration. The Commission's
analysis in the Mitchell Cotts-Sofiltra case38 and in the
Elopak-Metal Box Odin case' was based on the following
evaluation: (1) the absence of actual or potential competition
between the parties; (2) the parent companies' impossibility of
independently manufacturing the joint venture's products (this was
inferred from the lack of the necessary know-how and research and
development resources); (3) the absence of restrictions on the
parent companies' activities outside the joint venture's market; and
(4) the absence of restrictions on the joint venture.
Elopak-Metal Box Odin4
Elopak-Metal Box Odin, decided in 1990, concerned the
creation of a corporate joint venture (Odin) between a Norwegian
(Elopak) and a British (Metal Box) undertaking for research and
development of a new type of paper container for food. The parties
38. Commission Decision of Dec. 17, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 41) 31.
39. See infra part VII (discussing the case).
40. Commission Decision of July 13, 1990, 1990 OJ. (L 209) 15.
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had asked for a block exemption under Regulation 418/85 or, if
this was not the case, either a negative clearance or an individual
exemption.
The agreements entered into between the parent companies
contained the following provisions: (1) the joint venture's stock
would be owned 50% by each parent company, and the joint
venture's board of directors should be composed of an equal
number of members chosen by the parent companies; (2) the parent
companies would grant the joint venture an exclusive license for
the exploitation, in any country, of all their present and future
industrial property rights relating to the agreement; (3) the joint
venture would maintain such rights as secret, and utilize them
solely for the purposes laid down by the agreements; (4) any
improvement achieved by the joint venture would be recognized as
its own property; (5) should the joint venture decide not to exploit
the technology in a certain country, the parent companies would be
entitled to exploit the technology there, if the joint venture offered
this opportunity to third parties; (6) the parent companies could be
granted a non-exclusive license (not including the right to grant
sublicenses) of improvements, unless the exploitation of such
improvements could infringe upon the joint venture's rights under
the agreements (that is, any utilization not covered by the
agreements was practically allowed), or the joint venture decided
to exploit the improvements for its own purposes; (7) each parent
company would be allowed to carry out research and development
activities with third parties in the relevant field, provided that the
other parent company's know-how or the joint venture's
improvements were not utilized, unless this was permitted under
the agreements; (8) in the case of disputes concerning
implementation, infringement of the agreement, or the activity of
the joint venture, which could not be settled, each parent company
would be entitled to purchase the other parent company's shares;
(9) should the joint venture be wound up, the parent companies
would be granted analogous licenses, but they would be prevented
from utilizing the other parent company's know-how, or the
improvements achieved by the joint venture, with a competitor of
the parent company in question; (10) unless otherwise provided by
262
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the agreement, neither parent company would be allowed to sell its
shares without the other parent company's consent; and (11) all
information transferred to the joint venture, or to one of the parent
companies by the other, should be treated as confidential.
The Commission refused to grant an exemption pursuant to
article 7 of Regulation 418/85 because the cooperation not only
referred to production, but also to distribution. In addition, it was
noted that the grant of such an exemption would have required that
the agreements had infringed article 85.
A violation of article 85 was excluded for the following
reasons: (1) at the time of the stipulation of the agreement, the
parent companies were neither actual nor potential competitors; (2)
it was very unlikely that each parent company could independently
develop the relevant products, because they lacked the necessary
technology; (3) in order to develop the new products, the technical
knowledge of both parent companies was necessary (this would
reduce technical risks and costs); (4) the exclusive license to
exploit the joint venture's know-how in the field of the agreement
would ensure each parent company that the other would utilize all
its efforts for the achievement of the project; (5) the nonexclusive
license granted by the joint venture to the parent companies in
respect of the improvements, as well as the limitations concerning
the exploitation of the improvements, would ensure that the
know-how be exploited solely in the field covered by the
agreement; (6) even though the exclusive license granted to the
joint venture went beyond the initial starting period, and could last
as long as the joint venture existed, it was justified because the
parents' know-how was necessary to develop, manufacture, and
market the products; (7) the joint venture was not restricted in
respect to prices, quantity, or territory, even though the relevant
products could, to a certain extent, compete with the present
production of Metal Box; (8) the parent companies were not
restricted in research and development; (9) the possibility of
utilizing the other parent company's know-how, only within the
field covered by the agreement, was a necessary consequence of
the cooperation concerning a specific field of activity; (10) the
obligation for each of the parent companies not to allow, for a term
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of five years after the termination of the joint venture, that a
competitor of the other parent could utilize its know-how, was a
necessary result of the creation of the joint venture; (11) the
restriction concerning the joint venture's utilization of the parent
companies' know-how and the obligation to maintain such
know-how secret, were both necessary not to prejudice the purpose
and existence of the joint venture; and (12) the parties' obligations
in relation to licensing technology, upon dissolution or breakup of
the joint venture, were justified because, in this event, both parties
would be free to compete and use all know-how, including that of
the other party in the field of the agreements, and to use their own
and the joint venture's improvements, in any field. The
Commission also pointed out that there would be no implicit
restrictions on competition on the parent companies' activity,
except in the joint venture's field, because they were neither
potential competitors, nor could they have developed the new
product independently. In the light of the above considerations, a
negative clearance pursuant to article 2 of Regulation 17 was
granted.
VIII. THE GRANT OF AN INDIVIDuAL EXEMPTION
UNDER ARTICLE 85(3)
Under article 85(3) of the Treaty, the provisions of article 85(1)
may be declared inapplicable in the case of any agreement
which contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b)
afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products
in question.
The Commission's evaluation for the purpose of granting a
joint venture an exemption under article 85(3) usually takes the
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following circumstances into consideration:41 (1) whether the
economic benefits could be obtained through a lesser form of
cooperation (such as distribution and know-how licensing); (2)
whether the agreements impose restrictions on the parties which are
not indispensable for the achievement of the operation; (3) whether
the joint venture will contribute to the promotion of technical and
economic progress; (4) whether the consumers will benefit from the
results achieved; (5) whether the costs and financial risks involved
in independently carrying out the same activities can justify the
creation of the joint venture. With specific reference to joint
ventures entered into between European and extra-European
undertakings, the Commission has positively considered the
possibility that European undertakings could receive advanced
technology. 42
The cases in which an individual exemption was granted have
been chosen as some of the most significant decisions concerning
joint ventures. They have been divided into different categories
according to the purpose of the joint venture or the main reasons
on which the grant of an individual exemption was based.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, especially in the case of very
elaborate joint ventures, purposes and reasons for exemption often
overlap.
IX. CASES VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 85 TO WHICH AN
INDiviDUAL EXEMPTION WAS DENmD
The Commission has always exempted joint ventures which
were found to be violative of article 85, except in the Wano
Schwarzpulver4" and the Floral" cases. From the Commission's
analysis, it appears that the following circumstances may justify the
refusal of an individual exemption: (1) the elimination of
competition because of the insulation of geographical markets; (2)
41. BE .AMY & CH=, supra note 2, § 5-075, at 229.
42. See generally Commission Decision of July 14, 1986 (optical fibers), 1986 O.. (L 236)
30; see infra part XIII (discussing OliveuCanon).
43. Commission Decision of Oct. 20, 1978, 1978 OJ. (L 322) 26.
44. Commission Decision of Nov. 28, 1979, 1980 OJ. (L 39) 51.
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the absence of any improvement in production or technological
standards; and (3) the absence of any benefit for the consumer (this
is specifically the case where, as a result of the joint venture,
uniform prices would be charged, or the parties could achieve
monopolistic positions).
Wano Schwarzpulver
Wano Schwarzpulver, decided in 1978, concerned a corporate
joint venture (Wano) between Bohlen Industrie AG (Bohlen),
including its subsidiary Wasagchemie GmbH (Wasag), and Imperial
Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI), including its subsidiary Nobel's
Explosive Company Ltd. (NEC), for the production and distribution
of black powder.
The agreements and a letter of intent, notified to the
Commission, provided that: (1) ICI would purchase shares and
make certain capital contributions, in order to achieve joint and
equal control of Wano, previously wholly owned by Wasag; (2)
NEC would continue to operate its existing black powder plant
only until its customers could be transferred to the joint venture;
(3) NEC and Wasag would buy their total requirements of black
powder from the joint venture; (4) NEC and Wasag would assign
to the joint venture all their business, including know-how, patents,
and goodwill, relating to the manufacture of black powder; (5) the
joint venture would be jointly controlled by the parties through a
management board, to be equally appointed by the parents; and (6)
all the joint venture's important decisions would require the
consent of both parents.
The agreements entered into between the parties were held to
infringe article 85, because: (1) the joint control of the parent
companies on the joint venture (each of them would own 50% of
the joint venture's capital) would result in coordination of their
activities in the relevant market; (2) in the United Kingdom market,
the agreement would result in ICI (which fulfilled almost the entire
demand of black powder in such a market) purchasing all its future
black powder needs only from the joint venture; (3) since the
parent companies had relevant holdings in the joint venture, they
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would avoid competing between themselves or with the joint
venture, either with respect to the prices at which black powder
would be sold, or the efforts to be deployed to promote sales; (4)
the existence of the joint venture in a certain market would foster
cooperation between the parent companies in other markets; and (5)
each party would be likely to obtain from the joint venture the
same type of black powder at uniform prices.
The parties claimed that, even in the absence of the
participation of ICI in the joint venture, ICI would have no
alternative than to purchase its requirements for the U.K. demand
from Wano and, therefore, there would be no potential competition
in the supply of the U.K. market. The Commission rejected these
arguments on the ground that other EEC producers were available
to supply black powder in the U.K. market, particularly if Wano
had been left free to purchase the product from other suppliers. The
Commission observed that the agreements, if implemented, would
affect trade between member states because ICI would purchase its
demands only from the joint venture, thereby erecting additional
barriers to the entry of suppliers from other EEC countries. The
effects of such restrictions on competition would probably be
appreciable because: (1) the parties were groups of significant
importance; (2) they had considerable financial resources; (3) they
controlled a substantial share of distribution in the Community; and
(4) the relevant product was to be. considered "an essential
homogenous commodity in a highly oligopolistic market."
The grant of an exemption pursuant to article 85(3) was refused
because: (1) the implementation of the agreements would afford the
parties the possibility of eliminating competition of a substantial
part of the products in question in that the implementation of the
agreements would result in the insulation of the United Kingdom
market by precluding sales made by other suppliers; (2) the
agreements would result neither in a new manufacturing process
nor in an improvement in the production of black powder; (3) even
if the parties had claimed that the implementation of the notified
agreements would lead to a greater security of supply for black
powder and that ICI's participation in the joint venture was
necessary to obtain suitable supplies of black powder and to
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guarantee supplies of suitable qualities to its customers in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere, security of supply, in
circumstances in which there were considerable under-used
production capacities, could not be considered a benefit sufficient
for the purposes of article 85(3); (4) even on the assumption that
the agreements, if implemented, could contribute to an
improvement in the production or distribution of goods or to the
promotion of technical or economic progress, a fair share of any
such benefits would not become available to consumers; and (5)
the result of the agreement would be to enable ICI, an existing
monopoly distributor of black powder in the United Kingdom, also
to become jointly with Wasag a monopoly producer of black
powder for the United Kingdom and, in that position, ICI would be
subject to negligible competitive pressure to pass on to the
consumer any savings achieved through increased efficiency.
X. JOINT PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION
Joint production arrangements are a more sophisticated form of
specialization agreements; in both joint production and standard
specialization agreements, the parties restrict their possibility of
independently manufacturing certain products through the allocation
of production or through the transfer of production to common
entities.
Regarding specialization agreements, the Commission has taken
the view that such agreements are desirable since they can
contribute to lower costs by setting up long production runs and to
a better utilization of available production capacity through
concentration of efforts on a limited number of products. The
Commission approves of this result even if such agreements may
prevent a member producer from recommending the manufacture
of a product given up in favor of another producer or from
marketing directly under its own trademark in the territory of
another producer of the product in which he specializes (thereby
depriving consumers of stimulating competition between the
manufacturers). Such agreements are based on the allocation of
production between the parties accompanied by mutual obligations
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on each party to supply the other exclusively with the products in
which he should specialize for sale in the territory of the other
party. The essential condition for granting an exemption is that the
specialization shall not compromise the effectiveness of
competition in such a way that the parties can utilize the saving in
costs for their exclusive profit instead of sharing them fairly with
their customers. Also, competition at the distribution level must be
ensured by allowing intermediates to make parallel imports of the
specialized products covered by the agreement.4'
According to recital 3 of Regulation 417/85, concerning
specialization agreements:
agreements on specialization in production generally
contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods, because the undertakings concerned can concentrate
on the manufacture of certain products and thus operate
more efficiently and supply the products more cheaply
[and,] given effective competition, consumers will receive
a fair share of the resulting benefit.'
This appears to be consistent with the goals of the Commission's
policy, previously examined, which tend to foster the best possible
use of productive resources for the benefit of the consumer.
Joint production and distribution arrangements involving the
creation of a common entity do not fall within the block exemption
of Regulation 417/85.
Iveco/Ford7
Iveco/Ford, decided in 1988, concerned a series of agreements
between a British company related to the Ford group, Ford Motor
Company Ltd. (Ford U.K.), and a Dutch holding company
associated with the Fiat group, Iveco Industrial Vehicles
Corporation BV (Iveco), for the creation of a corporate joint
45. First Report on Competition Policy pt. One, ch. 1, § 1,1126-28, 2 EEC Competition L
Rep. (MB) at 1438-40.
46. Regulation 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of Article 83(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 3, 1985 OJ. (L 53) 1.
47. Commission Decision of July 20, 1988, 1988 OJ. (L 230) 39.
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venture (IC). The purpose of the joint venture was to manufacture
and distribute industrial vehicles, previously manufactured and
distributed by Ford U.K., and marketed as the Cargo line. It was
planned that the joint venture would distribute in the U.K. the
Iveco industrial vehicles supplementing the Cargo series and, later
on, a new generation of Iveco vehicles which would replace the
Cargo line. Pursuant to a shareholders' agreement, Iveco would be
entitled to appoint the majority of the members of the joint
venture's board of directors. All important decisions would be
approved by a qualified majority including the vote of at least one
member appointed by each parent.
The agreements included the following provisions: (1) Ford
U.K. would transfer to the joint venture the equipment and
personnel necessary to manufacture the Cargo vehicles; (2) the
joint venture would be entitled to utilize all the necessary industrial
property rights owned by the parties; (3) Ford U.K. would supply
the joint venture with the whole requirements of certain
components pertaining to the Cargo vehicles; (4) the joint venture
would grant Ford U.K. the exclusive distribution of spare parts for
the Cargo line; (5) joint distribution by the joint venture of Cargo
and Iveco's complementary vehicles was scheduled only for the
U.K., where the two specialized dealer networks of Ford U.K. and
Iveco should be combined, and it should be continued by the joint
venture on the basis of exclusive and selective distribution
arrangements in accordance with the pattern developed by Ford
U.K.; (6) the joint venture would be entitled to distribute Iveco's
products under the combined trademark "Iveco-Ford"; (7) sales in
the EEC and other countries would be made by the joint venture
solely through the Ford subsidiaries; (8) Ford U.K. would neither
manufacture nor sell industrial vehicles in Europe or the
non-European Mediterranean area; (9) Ford U.S. would neither
manufacture nor sell heavy trucks in Europe and would not
manufacture or market there the Cargo Ram industrial vehicles
currently being manufactured in Brazil and in the Mediterranean
area; (11) Iveco would not compete with the joint venture in the
U.K., and would market in the U.K. solely through the joint
venture, only the complementary Iveco products covered by the
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agreement; (12) Iveco would distribute its ancillary products solely
in the U.K., and only through the joint venture; (13) Iveco would
insure that the joint venture would not sell Cargo vehicles in
Australia, Brazil, Canada, or the U.S. unless their appearance had
been significantly modified; (14) both the restrictions on
competition affecting Iveco and the licensing agreements
concerning the trademarks "Ford Cargo" or "Iveco-Ford" were
due to expire no later than December 31, 1995; and (15) the parent
companies were not allowed to transfer their shares in the joint
venture's stock to third parties.
The Commission observed the following regarding the
applicability of article 85: (1) the joint venture would be jointly
controlled by the parent companies because of their equal holdings
and because all major decisions should be approved by a qualified
majority; (2) Ford U.K. had waived the possibility of
manufacturing industrial vehicles in Europe, but for the moment it
was not scheduled that the joint venture should be incorporated into
the Iveco Group; (3) Ford U.K. would continue to manufacture
such vehicles in the U.S. and would remain an important
manufacturer there which could also export to Europe; (4) a joint
venture between competitors, as was the case here, could not be
regarded as a new independent competitor in the relevant field; (5)
with respect to the joint venture, Iveco would remain an actual
competitor, since it would continue manufacturing competing
products which could be sold in the whole of the Common Market;
(6) the joint venture was bound by various agreements entered into
by the parent companies, concerning competition; (7) that Iveco's
industrial vehicles and spare parts could also be sold under Ford's
trademark (whereas the possibility of selling them under the joint
trademark "Iveco-Ford" would be allowed only in the U.K.) would
result in an allocation of markets and in parallel imports being
made more difficult; (8) the joint distribution scheduled through the
joint venture would involve restrictions on competition because the
members of the joint distribution networks would be allowed to
distribute the products only within the range of products fixed by
the parties; (9) the exclusive purchase agreement between the joint
venture and Ford U.K. would reduce the possibility of Iveco or
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other undertakings supplying the joint venture with the same
components; and (10) the agreements could appreciably affect trade
among member states, since both parent companies were active in
the Common Market.
The reasons for granting an individual exemption consist of: (1)
the joint venture would make it possible to achieve rationalization,
because market conditions forced heavy vehicle manufacturers to
produce a variety of types, since vehicles from a single
manufacturer were often sought so as to take advantage of uniform
maintenance and spare parts systems for different vehicle types and
models; (2) after phasing out the Cargo line, advantages should be
expected as soon as the joint venture and Iveco had produced and
marketed a common range of vehicles with common components;
(3) the combination of Iveco's dealer network with the substantially
larger Ford U.K. distribution network would increase Iveco's sales
and reduce its costs; (4) the joint venture and the restrictions
associated with it should be regarded as essential for achieving the
object of the cooperation and for improving the production and
distribution of the goods because the joint venture needed to be
certain, during the period in which the Cargo line had not been
replaced by the new lines, that the parent companies would not
jeopardize the situation; (5) the agreement would not result in
competition being eliminated with respect to a substantial part of
the relevant goods because it could be assumed that effective
competition existed in the Common Market in the heavy vehicles
sector; (6) it was also to be assumed that the cooperation between
the parties in the U.K. would not lead to any significant reduction
of competition in other areas of the Common Market; (7) for the
rest, the joint venture would not wholly exclude competition
between Ford U.K. and Iveco since, in member states other than
the U.K., the relevant heavy vehicles would continue to be sold
under different trademarks and through entirely separate
distribution channels; (8) it could be expected that consumers
would enjoy a fair share of the resulting benefit since the
consumers who had purchased Ford vehicles could now purchase
from the same distribution network vehicles complementary to the
Cargo line and could be offered a new range of vehicles
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manufactured by the joint venture; (11) since competitive pressure
from other suppliers was intense, it might be expected that the
resulting benefit would be, at least in part, transferred to
consumers; (10) there would also be advantages derived from
improved customer and after-sales services that could be brought
about through joint distribution and the combination of the dealer
networks; (11) the advantages to be expected from the agreements,
on the whole, would therefore outweigh the disadvantages
associated with the restrictions on competition. The exemption was
granted for a term of nine years.
XI. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Commission's position regarding joint research and
development is that it does
not generally restrict competition on condition that the
enterprises are not restricted as far as their own research
activities are concerned, and that the results of the joint
research are made available to all participants in proportion
to their participation. In principle, third parties must not be
excluded from the access to the results of joint research,
although the constitution of a joint research organization
justifies the obligation not to grant licenses to third
parties[,]48
except with the agreement of the contracting parties.49
According to Regulation 418/85, concerning research and
development agreements,
cooperation in research and development and in the
exploitation of the results generally promotes technical and
economic progress by increasing the dissemination of
technical knowledge between the parties and avoiding
duplication of research and development work, by
stimulating new advances through the exchange of
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complimentary technical knowledge, and by rationalizing
the manufacture of the products or application of the
processes arising out of the research and development.5"
Through such agreements, consumers "can generally be expected
to benefit from the increased volume and effectiveness of research
and development through the introduction of new or improved
products or services or the reduction of prices brought about by the
new or improved processes." 51
Continental-Michelin52
Continental-Michelin, decided in 1988, related to a cooperation
agreement between a German undertaking (Continental) and a
French undertaking (Michelin) for the development of a new type
of run-flat tire-wheel system for cars called "Reversed Hooking
Tire System" (RHT). The Commission noted that Continental was
one of the largest tire manufacturers in the world and Michelin the
second largest.
The agreement provided for an initial stage in which the RHT
system developed by Continental should be assessed. If the
assessment was successful, the purpose of the agreement would be,
during a second stage, to develop RHT tires on the basis of the
R-T system. In cooperation with customers, and in accordance
with their needs, a joint system of tire size standardization and
physical tolerances of RHT tires was to be established. The
cooperation would continue until the completion of the first R-T
and for five years after the year in which the R-T was marketed
by one of the parties. The cooperation would subsequently be
automatically renewed for additional periods unless terminated by
one of the parties. Should one of the parties decide to terminate the
cooperation, the other party would be allowed to continue to utilize
the other party's patents and know-how. Should one of the parties
50. Regulation 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, recital 4, 1985 OJ. (L 53) 5.
51. Il recital 5, at 5.
52. Commission Decision of Oct. 11, 1988, 1988 OJ. (L 305) 33.
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terminate the cooperation because it had developed a new tire with
better run-flat characteristics, that party would offer to revise the
agreement with the other party so that the new technology might
be incorporated by it. With respect to the technology, it was
provided that each party would remain the owner of its own work
product and all the improvements thereto made in the course of the
cooperation. Where the results had been developed from mutually
conceived ideas, the respective research and development managers
of each party would decide on a case-by-case basis who would be
the owner of the rights deriving therefrom.
The agreement provided for setting-up a common entity in a
country to be agreed upon by the parties. Each party was expected
to hold an equal interest in the joint venture and its decisions
would be taken by mutual agreement. The research and
development managers of each of the parties would be the co-
executive directors of the joint venture. The joint venture would
deal solely with the exploitation of patents and know-how. It would
also be the exclusive representative of each parent company for
granting patent or know-how licenses in any country and would
ensure the collection and distribution of the royalties paid by third
parties for the patents and know-how. Know-how would include all
secret information related to the RHT system either developed by
the parties or transferred to them prior to the stipulation of the
agreement or during its implementa, tion.
It was provided that the joint venture would grant the following
licenses: (1) A world-wide nonexclusive license to the parent
companies of the patents and know-how resulting from the
cooperation should one of them start manufacturing the products
during the implementation or after the termination of the
agreement; (2) a nonexclusive license to any other tire
manufacturer of the above patents and know-how for the purpose
of manufacturing the new system, if requested by one of the parent
companies, and after having consulted with the other; and (3) upon
Continental's request, a similar license should be granted to its
current licensees. Each parent company would be entitled to grant
to any of the above licensees, under freely agreed conditions, a
license for the know-how, the information, or the technical
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assistance not covered by the agreement. For five years after the
termination of the agreement, the parent companies would maintain
all technical information exchanged between them or their
subsidiaries as secret and would provide assistance to each other in
any action against patent infringements.
The parent companies were not restricted in their decision to
commercialize the system or any of its components. However, each
parent was required to inform the other party six months in
advance should the RHT be put on the market. The parties would
be free in their choice of motor vehicle manufacturers and to
establish the conditions on which they would present and sell the
RHT. However, they should coordinate the technical presentation
of the RHT to motor vehicle manufacturers. The cooperation in the
commercial development of the RI-T should continue for two years
following the year in which the RHT had first been marketed by
one of the parties.
In examining the applicability of article 85, the Commission did
not share the parent companies' view that they would put
competing tires on the market under their respective trademarks
which would show essential differences. In the Commission's
opinion, though cooperation was limited to the R-T system,
competition would be restricted because the motor-vehicle industry
would be limited in its choice to a single tire-wheel system.
Whereas, if the two partners had proceeded separately, the motor-
vehicle industry could have selected from among the rn-flat tire
systems that might then have been available the one which it would
have considered most suitable.
In addition, the Commission noted that: (1) since both parents
had, in practice, agreed to concentrate on the development of the
RHT and to abandon the development of their own systems, their
freedom of action would be restricted; (2) because of the exclusive
license granted to the joint venture of patents and know-how, the
parent companies had waived the possibility of granting licenses to
third parties; (3) since licenses to third parties could be granted
only upon the agreement of the parties, the joint exploitation of
patents and know-how through the joint venture would restrict
competition; and (4) the parent companies would not be completely
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free to commercialize the RUT system in the initial phase of their
cooperation.
The following provisions were considered not to restrict
competition: (1) The mutual assistance in proceedings for patent
infringements, and (2) the obligation to maintain all information
exchanged between the parent companies or their subsidiaries as
secret.
It was stressed that through the new system the parent
companies would acquire substantial time advantages on the other
tire manufacturers. The Commission observed that on the basis of
the technical potential of the jointly developed RHT system and its
superior running characteristics the parties could achieve a lead
which the other tire manufacturers would not be able to catch up
with even if, as anticipated, they received licenses for patents and
know-how deriving from the cooperation. Other tire manufacturers
would probably enter the market with their own fully developed
RUT only when the RHT of the Continental and Michelin groups
would be already well established on the market and accepted by
motor vehicle purchasers. It could therefore be assumed that the
pattern of sales of tires would be appreciably altered in favor of
these two groups. The agreement could consequently affect trade
between member states.
The Commission pointed out that pursuant to article 3(2) of
Regulation 418/85 the agreement would not fall within the field of
application of this block exemption, since the products
manufactured by the parties amounted to more than 20% of car
tires manufactured within the EEC.
Regarding the grant of an individual exemption under article
85(3), it was observed that: (1) joint research may be allowed even
if the firms concerned have a strong position in the market; (2)
only joint research and development would make it possible to
produce a tire-wheel system appropriate for industrial manufacture,
but further work was still necessary; (3) the parties had justified the
need for cooperation on the ground that Continental, on its own,
would not be able to solve the numerous technical problems
involved nor would it be able to do so without a considerable delay
in time; (4) one producer alone could not introduce such a tire
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system in the motor vehicle industry, since motor vehicle
manufacturers always wish to collaborate with at least two tire
producers so as to avoid bottlenecks in supply; (5) the new system
could offer advantages not obtainable through the traditional
system; and (6) the benefit to consumers would consist of the
possibility of a safer run-flat tire being available.
The Commission noted that in assessing the length of
cooperation in the technical and commercial area account should
be taken of article 3 of Regulation 418/85, which limits the
exemption of such cooperation between noncompeting undertakings
or between competitors with a combined market share of under
20%, to the duration of the research and development program.
Where the results are jointly exploited, an additional period of five
years from the time the contract products are first put on the
market within the Common Market is added to the time for
research and development. Where there is cooperation between
competitors having a strong market position, because of the larger
impact on competition, cooperation should be restricted to the
period essential for the implementation of the program. The
Commission considered that the setting of the length of cooperation
on the commercial introduction of the RHT at two years was in
line with these principles. Also, the length of cooperation provided
for research and development was held to be appropriate. The
Commission pointed out that both partners should be allowed
through minimum coordination requirements during the initial stage
of marketing and in the establishment of uniform standards to
attempt to lay down starting conditions which would be the same
for both so as to ensure that their development work would be
rewarded.
The Commission noted, regarding the joint exploitation of
patents and know-how by the joint venture, that such a restriction
fell within the framework of the block exemption for joint
exploitation under Regulation 418/85, on which individual
exemption decisions should be based. According to article 2(d), the
block exemption applies provided that joint exploitation relates to
results which are decisive for the manufacture of the contract
products or the application of the contract processes. According to
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the Commission, this did not exclude the possibility of joint
exploitation of technical knowledge that existed before the
cooperation began if, as argued by the parties, such knowledge
became a component of joint development to such an extent that
it should be considered necessary for the manufacture, use, or sale
of the RHT.
As to the coordination for the grant of licenses of the whole of
the technical knowledge necessary for the manufacture of the RUT,
the Commission held that this would lead to a simplification of
administrative procedures for licensees and would also ensure a
correct distribution between the two parties of the royalties arising
from the agreement. According to the Commission, competition
would be eliminated only in the system but not with respect to
other construction features of the RHT or to conventional radial
tires and would continue to exist with all the other tire
manufacturers.
An individual exemption pursuant to article 85(3) was granted
with different terms of duration according to the different objects
of the cooperation, specifically: (1) ten years for the cooperation in
research and development; (2) two years for commercial
development; and (3) twenty years for the activity of the common
entity. The parties were asked to inform the Commission without
delay of any extension of the cooperation to other tire categories
and of all instances of licenses granted or refused to third parties
and, every two years, on the evolution of the cooperation.
XII. REDUCTION OF CAPACrrIES AND RATIONALIZATION
OF AcTivrn
As pointed out by the Commission, a competition "policy
encourages the best possible use of productive resources," whereas
"ill adjusted structures which are encouraged by inflation give use
to under-utilisation of the [EEC] labour potential. . . ."' This is
the reason why reduction of capacities or rationalization of
53. First Report on Competition Policy Introduction, 2 EEC Competition L Rep. (MB) 1407
(1971).
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activities, which inevitably involve restrictions on competition, are
preferable to the maintenance of structures which are no longer
competitive or have become obsolete. It has already been seen that,
in joint production ventures, rationalization has been considered a
valid ground to exempt restrictions resulting from the parties'
waiving their autonomous possibility of manufacturing certain
products (the ratio is the same in the case of specialization
agreements). Rationalization of production is incompatible with the
maintenance of anti-economic activities which have the effect of
distorting competition and raising inflation, in that such units can
remain competitive only through state aid. The artificial
maintenance of activities, which are no longer competitive, through
state aid can restrict technological improvement and prejudice
competitors who can rely only on their own capabilities of
efficiency and innovation to achieve a competitive balance between
costs and prices. On the contrary, as stressed in the Enichem-ICI
case, rationalization which leads to the elimination of
noncompetitive units can make it possible to achieve higher
standards in the surviving facilities and to reduce costs.
Enichem-IC1f4
Enichem-ICI, decided in 1987, concerned the creation of
European Vinyls Corporation (EVC), a corporate joint venture in
the chemical field between an Italian (Enichem) and a British (ICI)
undertaking. The jointly owned company would operate in the
vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) and polyvinylchloride (PVC)
sectors. The decision also related to certain agreements between
Enichem and ICI to shut down, reduce the capacity of, or convert,
certain plants or facilities.
The products covered in the agreements were all derivatives of
ethylene (obtained from the cracking of naphtha) and either
chlorine or hydrogen chloride (HCL). The agreements covered
Enichem and ICI's interests in VCM and all forms of PVC, but
some of their plants were not included.
54. Commission Decision of Dec. 22, 1987, 1988 OJ. (L 50) 18.
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The Commission observed that, with many sectors of the
petrochemical industry in western Europe suffering from structural
overcapacity, manufacturers had been forced at the beginning of the
1980s to look for ways of reducing their capacity either by
individual closures or through bilateral deals with other producers.
One consequence of such deals had been the progressive reduction
of the number of competitors in each sector and the tendency
towards markets characterized by an oligopolistic structure. Both
Enichem and ICI were now in the second round of restructuring,
having already rationalized their capacity in other sectors through
swap deals with Montedison and British Petroleum, respectively. At
the time of the agreements, the EDC-VCM-PVC sector still had
substantial overcapacity, despite previous rationalization programs.
Because of the complex integration of the industry (all major
producers were vertically integrated with ethylene and chlorine
production), any changes and particularly reductions of capacity, at
one level of the vertical chain of production, would have
implications for the other levels.
The basic agreement between Enichem and ICI was signed in
February 1986. Under its terms, EVC would be set up as a 50-50
jointly owned enterprise to produce and sell VCM and all forms of
PVC. EVC would operate for at least five years, starting October
1, 1986. After this period, EVC might be dissolved, but the party
withdrawing from it should offer its shares to the other. EVC
would be run by a holding company incorporated in the
Netherlands. The holding company would wholly own a
Coordination Centre in Brussels, which should coordinate the
operations of EVC throughout the world, four local operating
companies, and two local sales companies. EVC was expected to
undertake research, development, production, and marketing of the
products covered by the agreement. Enichem and ICI would make
available to EVC, free of charge, their most up-to-date technology
(including know-how and patents), research and development
facilities, and personnel, through research service agreements, in
Porto Marghera (owned by Enichem) and Runcorn (owned by ICI).
Part of the personnel would be transferred to EVC. EVC should
own the results of research, including any patent rights arising from
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it. Enichem and ICI would dedicate the entire capacity of their
plants, for manufacturing the VCM and PVC products, exclusively
to EVC. For legal and business reasons, however, the parent
companies would retain the ownership of the plants and only
agreed not to compete with the jointly owned company.
EVC would be responsible for all aspects of distribution,
marketing, selling, and technical services. Both Enichem and ICI
undertook to supply exclusively to EVC, the raw material
requirements of the plants dedicated to it. Enichem and ICI also
entered into a supplementary agreement on the distribution of
plasticizers for use in the manufacture of PVC compound. Under
this agreement, EVC would act as sales agent for Enichem's
primary plasticizers in Italy, where Enichem sold the overwhelming
majority of its primary plasticizers for PVC applications. EVC
would also act as a sales agent for ICI's primary and secondary
plasticizers in other European countries. Both Enichem and ICI
would continue to sell plasticizers directly outside such countries.
The Commission noted that, according to the agreements,
Enichem and ICI would, through their jointly owned company,
close down substantial VCM-PVC production capacity over the
years 1986 to 1988. The closures would amount to an important
share of the total estimated surplus capacity in the VCM-PVC
sector in western Europe in 1986. The plants to be closed were the
older and less efficient ones. The global restructuring would also
include a more rational allocation of production of the different
PVC grades and qualities among the plants dedicated to the jointly
owned company, with a view to optimizing transport costs.
The agreements between Enichem and ICI were considered to
fall within article 85(1), since they would restrict competition and
affect trade between member states. The Commission pointed out
that the agreements should be analyzed as a whole, emphasizing
their economic consequences. They had the object and effect of
restricting competition within the Common Market, because: (1)
one of the main purposes was to reduce the capacity of each parent
company; (2) in order to allow the jointly owned company to
operate and to achieve its objectives, the agreements provided for
a continued cooperation between EVC and the parents, which
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would remain potential competitors; (3) after the creation of the
jointly owned company, both parties would remain potential
competitors and, in some cases, actual competitors, between
themselves and in relation to EVC, for the products in question; (4)
there would be no transfer of assets to the jointly owned company;
(5) agreements between competitors designed to close plants and
limit capacity, by their very nature, had a direct effect on
competition; (6) EVC would be dependent on the continued
cooperation of each parent, and this would have a direct impact on
competition between them; (7) the supply commitments between
the parties and the jointly owned company would restrict
competition with third parties; and (8) the jointly owned company
would also depend on the cooperation of the parties for the
marketing of its products in countries where no local operating or
sales company was present.
The Commission stressed that Enichem and ICI would remain
actual competitors in the markets of the jointly owned company,
because some facilities would remain wholly owned and managed
by the parents, although their production should basically be
supplied to EVC. On the other hand, ICI had interests in companies
outside western Europe, which manufactured VCM-PVC and were
capable of selling it into the Common Market in competition with
the jointly owned company. Also the parents and the jointly owned
company would remain potential competitors because Enichem and
ICI, as independent undertakings, would remain actual competitors
at the upstream level of production dedicated to the jointly owned
company. For two groups as large as Enichem and ICI, with
extensive technological expertise and with the active presence they
had both retained in the upstream business, it would be
comparatively easy and cheap to reenter the downstream
businesses, which they would transfer to EVC, and for which they
should provide all the feedstock requirements. Potential competition
would also be maintained by the decision not to transfer to the
jointly owned company the majority of the personnel, the
ownership of the production facilities, research centers, patents, and
know-how.
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The Commission also noted that the parties had not transferred
their assets to the jointly owned company. Actually, the production
facilities and the research centers dedicated to EVC would remain
the property of the parents and would remain absolutely dependent
on the parents for services, raw materials, technology, patents, and
personnel. The joint venture would, therefore, involve neither the
creation of an autonomous entity, nor any total withdrawal from the
market of the parents, which after the agreement would remain
independent undertakings.
The effect on trade between member states was due to the
agreement's concern with products in which there was substantial
intra-Community trade. As a result of the agreements, the whole
structure of competition would be substantially changed from the
point of view of both users and other producers in the Community.
The conditions required for the grant of an individual
exemption were considered to exist, because: (1) through the
agreements, the parent companies could reorganize their activities
in the relevant field more quickly and radically than through
individual initiatives; (2) the agreements would create objective
benefits-notably through an extensive program of capacity closures
in a sector suffering from structural overcapacity-which would
outweigh the above mentioned restrictions of competition; (3) the
rationalization would improve technical efficiency and make it
possible for the parent companies to eliminate productive units
which were no longer competitive; (4) the rationalization would
also enable each party to absorb more easily, at a financial and
commercial level, the closures they had previously carried out
separately; (5) because of the elimination of some plants, the
relevant activities could be concentrated in more advanced
productive units; (6) the transfer of technology from the parent
companies to the joint venture would allow the joint venture to
dispose of more advanced technology; (7) had the parent
companies unilaterally closed their superfluous activities, the clients
would have borne the negative consequences; (8) the reduction of
the parent companies' surplus capacities was possible only through
the joint venture; (9) the agreements for the transfer of the relevant
technology to the joint venture were necessary to develop new
284
1992 / Commission's Evaluation of Joint Ventures Under Art. 85
products and technology; (10) since the agreements provided for
the dedication of patents and know-how from Enichem and ICI to
the jointly owned company, which should become responsible for
all research and development activities in the sector concerned,
EVC would benefit from the most up-to-date technology of the
parents and of their respective research centers; (11) the unification
of productive activities would allow a certain reallocation of
production among the plants and specialization in different grades
or subgrades, which could strengthen the rationalization and bring
the production centers closer to their natural markets, thus reducing
the costs of transport; and (12) similar advantages, at the
distribution level, would derive from the agreement on plasticizers,
especially since the range offered by EVC would be more complete
than the ranges previously sold separately by Enichem and ICI.
As to advantages for the consumer, the Commission noted that
the agreements would allow users, who were essentially in the
downstream PVC processing industry, a fair share of the resulting
benefits. The cooperation agreements would allow rationalization
and ensure users a continued supply of products of traditional and
probably better quality. Furthermore, users would benefit from the
development of the products and the technologies achieved through
the unification of the parties' EVC research and development
activities. Regarding the agreements on plasticizers, benefits to
customers would derive from the possibility of being offered a
wider range of products by the same seller.
On the indispensability of the restrictions, the Commission
observed that: (1) the agreements between Enichem and ICI were,
in the context of structural overcapacity of the market in question,
indispensable for the attainment, in the short term, of the above
mentioned objectives (this was because the radical restructuring
could not be achieved so quickly and be so radical, had it been left
entirely to market forces, with each party acting independently); (2)
because of the specific integrated nature of petrochemicals, there
were clear links between activities in the upstream and downstream
markets, with the result that any capacity reduction downstream
would have a knock-down effect upstream and vice versa; (3) the
restructuring by fully coordinated cooperation could only be
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achieved through the creation of a jointly owned company; (4) the
agreements whereby the parents would make available to the
jointly owned company patents, know-how, and research centers,
were closely connected with the creation of EVC, and were
essential for obtaining the expected benefits in the development of
products and technologies; and (5) the arrangements for supplying
raw materials or intermediate or auxiliary products, or for providing
utilities or services, were equally indispensable in view of the cost
advantages they would offer, as well as in order to avoid the
adverse knock-down effect.
According to the Commission, the agreements between
Enichem and ICI, and in particular the arrangements to close
certain production facilities, would not afford the parties the
possibility of eliminating competition for a substantial part of the
products in question. This result would occur because there was a
substantial trade within the EEC, and because the European market
was characterized by insignificant barriers to the entry either of
new producers or importers. The continuation of workable
competition and, especially, the presence of strong competitors
among European manufacturers, would not enable EVC to exercise
market power in the short and medium terms. As to the plasticizers
market, its structure was, in the Commission's view, more
competitive than for VCM-PVC. Notwithstanding the agreement,
there would be a high degree of workable competition and users
would be able to switch between suppliers in response to price or
service criteria. Furthermore, EVC, although combining the sales
of Enichem and ICI in this sector, would not become the largest
undertaking.
On the issue of duration and conditions for the exemption, the
Commission observed that, in view of the nature of the agreements
and the short-term outlook for the VCM-PVC industry and its
markets, the significant capacity closures and rationalization
undertaken through the jointly owned company represented the
basic reasons for exempting the agreements. However, the creation
of EVC would have an important impact on competition,
strengthening the position of the largest undertaking in the market.
Therefore, the duration of the exemption should be fixed at five
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years. The Commission stressed that neither the jointly owned
company nor its parents should, with respect to the products
covered by the agreements, maintain, either directly or indirectly,
any interests in competing producer or distributor undertakings of
a kind likely to serve as an instrument for influencing the
commercial conduct of such undertakings within the Common
Market. To enable the Commission to check that the conditions of
the exemption would be scrupulously complied with, the jointly
owned company and each parent were required to submit a report
to the Commission every year. The report must give details of the
implementation of the rationalization plan and of the progress
achieved. In view of the overall trends in the thermoplastics
markets, of the dangers which an increase of market power could
represent for the maintenance of free competition within the EEC,
and of the already strong position achieved by EVC on the market,
the jointly owned company and its parents were required to inform
the Commission in advance of any initiative, planned by them or
their subsidiaries or associated companies, with reference to the
products under consideration or to other products on the upstream
or downstream markets. The jointly owned company and the
parents were also required to inform the Commission, in advance
of any renewals of, or extensions in the scope or nature of, or
amendments or additions to, the agreements.
XIII. INCREASE IN THE COMPETITIVE STANDARDS OF
THE EEC INDUSTRY AND AvOIDANcE OF
FINANCIAL RISKS INVOLVED IN
INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS
As has already been seen, among the main goals of the
Commission's policy are the improvement of efficiency in the EEC
industry, reduction of costs, and the possibility of consumers being
offered more advanced products at cheaper prices. Therefore, the
Commission's attitude has always encouraged the transfer of
advanced technology from outside the Common Market to EEC
industries, particularly in those sectors where competition from
Japanese industries is strong. The necessity of achieving high
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standards of quality, while at the same time reducing research and
development costs, has been positively evaluated in Olivetti-Canon.
Innovation is an indispensable condition for remaining competitive.
As a result, the transfer of advanced technology from the American
industry has been considered a sufficient ground to exempt the
restrictions on competition resulting from joint development and
manufacture.
Olivetti/Canon55
Olivetti/Canon, decided in 1987, concerned a joint venture
(OCI) between an Italian, Ing. C. Olivetti & C. spa (Olivetti), and
an American undertaking, Canon Inc. (Canon), for the development
and manufacture of copying machines. The scope of OCI's
business was to develop, design, and manufacture copying machine
products. The activities of OCI would take place in two phases.
During Phase I, it would mainly manufacture copying machine
products in the speed-range of ten to twenty copies per minute. In
Phase II, the parties might decide to produce, in addition to
copying machine products, other office automation products, such
as laser beam printer products and facsimile products. The
production of higher speed copying machines might also be
considered. Phase II was expected to start in early 1989.
Regarding the relevant products market, the Commission
observed that from the 1970s, when plain-paper copiers started to
be manufactured in the EEC, the number of EEC manufacturers
had progressively diminished. The main producers, Rank Xerox
(United Kingdom) and Oce (Netherlands) aside, some of the
smaller companies-in terms of number of models
manufactured-were unable to keep pace with innovation and
decreasing prices in office copying, which had mainly come from
Japanese companies. Most had converted their business to original
equipment manufacturer's (OEM) distribution of Japanese machines
(distributed under their own brand name of OEM products).
Whereas Olivetti and Develop (Germany) continued to manufacture
55. Commission Decision of Dec. 22, 1987, 1988 OJ. (L 52) 51.
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in the low range only. In addition, Olivetti's subsidiary, Triumph
Adler (Germany), currently distributed, on an OEM basis, copiers
of the Japanese company, Mita. Conversely, Japanese companies
had progressively set up manufacturing points in the EEC. Canon
had introduced major innovations in the field of copying machines.
As to facsimile machines, Canon had a full line of products,
from desktop models to sophisticated broadcasting facsimile and
G4 machines, which made it one of the EEC leaders in this field.
With regard to laser printers, the Commission noted that, despite
the number of competitors (mostly Japanese companies), the two
most significant laser printer manufacturers in the world were
Canon, for the low-end range, and Xerox, for the medium and high
range. Canon had the basic technology to produce color laser
printers, which had been introduced in 1986.
The agreements entered into between the parties consisted,
among others things, of a master business agreement, a license
agreement, a technical assistance agreement, a secrecy agreement,
and a shareholders agreement. The planned joint venture (OCI)
would be a manufacturing operation owned by Olivetti at 50% plus
one share and by Canon at 50% minus one share. The products
manufactured by the joint venture would be sold independently by
the two partners, mainly through their own distribution networks.
Olivetti would transfer both its copier research and production
activities to the joint venture. A large majority of components for
the products manufactured by the joint venture would be supplied
by Olivetti; the rest, by Canon and by third companies.
Among the provisions of the master business agreement, the
following were the most significant: (1) the parent companies
would transfer their own experiences in the development of the
relevant products to the joint venture; (2) the parent companies
would insure that the joint venture would strictly cooperate with
them in order to reduce the costs for purchasing the necessary
components; (3) the components would be purchased preferably
from the parent companies, provided that the conditions were
favorable; (4) the products manufactured by the joint venture,
developed by Canon or based on Canon's technology, and
developed by Olivetti or the joint venture, could be sold
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respectively by Olivetti and Canon, under trademarks designated by
them, to certain companies outside their groups, only by mutual
agreement; (5) except for the previous case, on the products
distributed through Olivetti or Canon, the parent companies'
respective trademarks should be affixed; (6) the products
manufactured by the joint venture, and marketed in the EEC or
elsewhere, should be differentiated in their appearance and other
features, in a manner that the parties might agree to; and (7) unless
terminated upon the agreement of the parent companies, the
agreement would remain in force until both parent companies
maintained a holding in the joint venture.
The license agreement provided for the grant to the joint
venture of a nontransferable license covering patents and
know-how. The parties would communicate to each other any
improvement concerning the products under license, whereas the
joint venture would not disclose any confidential information
during the implementation of the agreement, or after its
termination.
According to the shareholders' agreement, the board of
directors of the joint venture would be composed of six members.
Olivetti and Canon agreed that each would designate three
members of the board of directors. The shareholder's meetings
would act by absolute majority of shares on all matters. An
exception was provided for the sale of all, or almost all, of the
assets, the acquisition of its own shares by the joint venture,
merger or consolidation, dissolution of the' joint venture, and
allocation of profits. In these cases, the approval of more than 70%
of the shares was required.
The Commission pointed out that the agreements should be
evaluated together and not separately, and that both the creation of
the joint venture and certain clauses of the agreements would
restrict competition. It further observed that the joint venture would
be controlled jointly by the parent companies, because neither
could make any relevant decision without the participation of the
other. The parent companies were actual competitors in the field of
fax appliances and certain types of copying machines. It was held,
regarding laser printers, that Olivetti was neither an actual nor a
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potential competitor because, in order to reconvert its plants, some
time and considerable investments would be necessary. It was
therefore unreasonable to think that Olivetti could, alone, face the
high financial risks involved in producing laser printers.
As a result of the creation of the joint venture, competition
would be restricted at the levels of production and sales, because:
(1) the manufacturing costs would be equally sustained by both
parties and, therefore, in determining its sale prices, each parent
company would be less autonomous than it would be if its
manufacturing costs were different; and (2) the products sold would
be substantially the same, except as to trademark and appearance.
Also, at the level of investment and development of the
products, competition would be significantly reduced because: (1)
it was unlikely that the parent companies, after having invested
considerable amounts in the joint venture, would make substantial
competing investments; and (2) since development and projects
would be jointly carried out within the joint venture, there would
be no reason why the parent companies should independently invest
in the same field.
The obligation on the parties to promote the sale of the joint
venture's products was held to reduce their business independence
and the possibility of competing through the distribution of other
products, as well as to restrict competition by other manufacturers
in the supply of the parent companies. The necessity of an
authorization of the other parent company for any supply of
products manufactured by the joint venture on the basis of the
other parent company's technology, and made by any parent
company to firms outside its own group, would restrict
competition. Such restriction would affect the parent companies and
third party undertakings, which might be interested in purchasing
the joint venture's products from the parent companies for the
purpose of resale. The obligation on each parent company to sell
the joint venture's products under its own trademark and through
its own distribution network, would limit the independence of its
sales and trademark policy, and would make it impossible for third
party undertakings to obtain from the parent companies a license
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to distribute the joint venture's products, or to utilize the parent
companies' trademarks.
The obligation of the parent companies to individualize their
products could restrict competition, in that each of them would be
prevented from offering products similar to those of the other party.
Nevertheless, in so far as competition could also consist in
individualizing a product for the purpose of increasing sales, it was
not proved that such an obligation could appreciably restrict
competition. The same conclusion was reached with regard to the
obligation of the joint venture to purchase components preferably
from the parent companies, because such an obligation would, for
all practical purposes, depend on whether the conditions of the
parent companies were actually competitive in comparison with
those offered by third parties.
The following clauses of the licensing agreement were
considered to restrict competition: (1) the exclusive territorial
license granted to the joint venture (because it would prevent the
parent companies from manufacturing in the territory, and third
parties from being granted a license in the territory); (2) the
obligation to mutually exchange improvements concerning the
licensed technology; and (3) the obligations concerning the
products and the territory under license (because they would restrict
the manufacturing possibilities of the joint venture). The obligations
not to grant sublicenses or to transfer the license, and to maintain
the know-how as secret, even after the termination of the
agreement, were held not to restrict competition significantly.
Nevertheless, such restrictions were found to prejudice trade among
member states because the products manufactured by the joint
venture would also be distributed within the EEC.
Grant of an individual exemption under article 85(3) was
justified because the joint venture would contribute to the
improvement of technical and economic progress, since the increase
of production capacity resulting from the joint venture would allow
the parties to share the necessary investments and to avoid high
costs, which would make products prices noncompetitive. Through
the joint venture, a European undertaking (Olivetti) could receive
advanced technology from outside the Common Market. On the
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other hand, consumers would have the benefit of competitive prices
and new products manufactured on the basis of an advanced
technology. The advantages resulting from an increase in the
European technology standard would not have been possible
through a mere licensing agreement since only the participation of
the parties in the joint venture could allow a continuous flow of
new technology. The following restrictions were regarded as
necessary: (1) the obligation to promote and sell the products; (2)
the necessity of obtaining the other parent company's consent for
the sales previously discussed (the purpose of this obligation was
to avoid the technology developed by one party from being utilized
to manufacture products which, through the other party, might be
sold to competitors of the first party); (3) the obligation of each
parent company to sell under its own trademark and through its
distribution network; (4) the exclusive character of the license
granted to the joint venture; and (5) the restrictions concerning the
products and the territory under license.
In discussing the duration of the exemption, the Commission
stressed that, in the case of production joint ventures requiring
substantial long term investments and concerning a new product,
a term of twelve years would be indispensable so that the parties
could rely on the enforceability of the agreements and obtain
satisfactory remuneration for their investments. The following
obligations were imposed: (1) to provide the Commission with a
report on the overall activities of the joint venture, and the overall
application of the exempted agreements, every two years; and (2)
to inform the Commission of any new agreement in relation to the
exempted agreements and of any modification or extension of the
same.
XV. STANDARDIZATION OF PRODUCTS
Concerning joint advertising, joint use of quality labels, and
standardization of products, the Commission has observed that joint
advertising does not restrict competition if participants are not
prevented from carrying out their own publicity. Also, agreements
on the use of common quality labels do not restrict competition if
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competitors whose products satisfy the required quality conditions
may use the labels on the same terms as the members themselves.
Agreements on uniform application of standards and types may
come under the general ban of cartels if they are linked with the
obligation to manufacture or sell only those products which have
been the object of jointly fixed standards. However, the
Commission has recognized that they help in rationalizing
production through a better utilization of production capacity and
improvement of supply conditions due to the increased
interchangeability of the products concerned to the benefit of the
consumer.56 The advantages of utilizing interchangeable products
are considered (in Part X) in the Iveco/Ford case where, as a result
of the utilization of common components, consumers could be
offered products complementary to those already in their
possession, as well as uniform maintenance and interchangeable
spare parts.
On the other hand, standardization of products can restrict
competition. Certain competitors may be able to achieve significant
time advantages against their competitors, and consumers are
restricted in their possibility of choosing among competing
products. Nevertheless, in the Continental-Michelin case, the
development of a new, common tire-wheel system was exempted,
even though it would give the parties a significant advantage over
other manufacturers.
In the Sopelem/Vickers case, standardization of components
between two manufacturers of microscopes was considered to
foster reduction of costs and the possibility of having
interchangeable products.
Sopelem/Vicker 7
Sopelem/Vickers, issued in 1977, concerned three contracts
[collectively referred to as the agreement] concluded on April 17,
56. First Report on Competition Policy pt. One, ch. I, § 1, 11 36-39, 2 EEC Competition L.
Rep. (MB) at 1447-50.
57. Commission Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, 1978 OJ. (L 70) 47.
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1975 between a French company (Sopelem), Vickers Ltd., London
[hereinafter Vickers], and Microscopes Nachet SA, Paris
[hereinafter Nachet]. The products covered by the agreement were
microscopes, stereo-microscopes, and microdensitometers
manufactured by Sopelem and Vickers, as well as all spare parts
and accessories for these instruments. According to the agreement,
Vickers would acquire 49% of the shares of Nachet, which, until
then, had been a wholly controlled subsidiary of Sopelem, in
charge of marketing and distribution of Sopelem's products. Thus,
Nachet would turn into a joint venture company of Sopelem and
Vickers. The system, set up by Sopelem and Vickers, aimed at
establishing the basis for a progressive technical cooperation
between the two companies in the field of microscopy, and a future
common structure for distribution (Nachet).
The agreement provided that cooperation between the parties be
carried out in the following way: (1) the parties would cooperate
and coordinate their activities through regular contacts between
their research and development teams and by means of a
comprehensive exchange of expertise and know-how in the field of
microscopy; (2) each of the parties would, concurrently, continue
its own research and development activities, and manufacturing in
this field; (3) common production to be undertaken by the joint
venture company (Nachet) was not scheduled at the time; (4)
however, technical cooperation was established with a view to
reaching a standardization of components, so that Sopelem parts
might be fitted into Vickers instruments and vice versa; and (5) the
parties envisaged a specialized division of their production between
their respective factories in order to avoid irrational double
production (such specialization should take into account the
particular knowledge and expertise of each of the parties in relation
to the production of particular features or components).
As regards distribution, it was agreed that: (1) Nachet would be
the exclusive distributor in the Common Market (with the
exception of Ireland and the U.K.) of all microscopes manufactured
by Sopelem and of certain types manufactured by Vickers; (2)
Vickers would be the exclusive distributor in Ireland and the U.K.
of certain types of microscopes manufactured by Sopelem and of
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its own microscopes; (3) Nachet would be the exclusive distributor
in other European and African countries of both Sopelem and
Vickers' microscopes and accessories; (4) Vickers would be the
exclusive distributor of Sopelem microscopes in all countries of the
world, except those attributed to Nachet under item 3; (5) each
distributor would purchase from the principal all of its requirements
for sale in its territory, but could independently fix its sale prices
and would offer adequate maintenance for the products sold in the
license territory; (6) each distributor would not sell any competing
products; (7) even though Sopelem or Vickers would be free to
accept unsolicited orders from any part of the Common Market,
they could neither maintain stocks, nor advertise the products in
other member states; and (8) they would not, directly or through
any intermediary, endeavor to obtain orders for the products outside
their respective distribution territories.
As to products and technical cooperation, the Commission
noted that: (1) the microscopes covered by the agreement ranged
from a more elementary level, through an intermediary level, to
highly sophisticated instruments; (2) Sopelem and Vickers
produced a wide range of microscopes, although at that time only
Sopelem manufactured stereo-microscopes; (3) the more elementary
level microscopes were numerically the biggest range for both
Sopelem and Vickers; (4) there was only little similarity and
overlapping between Sopelem and Vickers in more advanced and
sophisticated instruments; (5) due to their individual research
results and expertise, their instruments at these levels were more
complementary than competing because altogether they made up a
complete range of instruments and not two ranges of identical and
competing microscopes; (6) as a consequence, there was no actual
interchangeability between the final products of each party, but
only between a number of parts of the parties' microscopes,
whereas one of the aims of the agreement was to increase this
interchangeability; (7) it was the intention of the parties, through
their cooperation in research and development, to move out of the
routine area of microscopes towards more specialized and
sophisticated levels of instruments; and (8) in this sense, the first
-result of the parties' cooperation under the agreement had already
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been achieved, because they were able to introduce a new type of
microscope, developed on the basis of experience and designs
exchanged between them.
The Commission noted, with regard to the situation of the
relevant market, that: (1) in the wide range of products
manufactured by Sopelem and Vickers, the microscopes falling
under the agreement were of minor importance to both companies;
(2) both Sopelem and Vickers were engaged in a wide range of
other activities in the technical field; (3) because competition in the
Common Market was strong for the products concerned, neither
Sopelem nor Vickers had been able to obtain appreciable market
shares outside France (Sopelem), Ireland, and the United Kingdom
(Vickers); (4) the most important competitors for the products in
question were Zeiss, Leitz, and Will, which currently held a market
share of approximately 50% of all sales of microscopes in the
Common Market; (5) Japanese manufacturers were believed to hold
an overall market share of 30% to 35% of all sales in the Common
Market of the microscopes concerned; (6) prior to the agreement,
the parties had sold their microscopes in EEC countries outside
their traditional markets (France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom),
mainly via agents; (7) the costs related to marketing and
distribution of specialized precision instruments, such as
microscopes, were high because of the importance of having
specialized distributors; and (8) furthermore, it was important to
maintain a sufficient stock of the instruments, as well as having
adequate facilities.
According to the Commission, the reason article 85 should
apply, entailed: (1) even though, before the creation of the joint
venture, Sopelem and Vickers had been actual competitors solely
of certain types of microscopes, they were potential competitors
with reference to other products because, in light of their expertise
and skill in producing the products concerned, they would have
been able to extend their ranges of products, thus becoming direct
competitors in the production of microscopes for similar purposes;
(2) the technical cooperation and exchange of research and
development could eliminate competition between the parties in
this field; (3) the standardization of various parts of the
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microscopes and the specialization in their production, taking into
account each party's special knowledge and expertise, would affect
the ability of both parties to remain active on the market as
independent developers and manufacturers of microscopes or parts;
(4) the distribution arrangement, whereby Vickers would be
appointed the sole distributor of both parents' products in Ireland
and the United Kingdom, and the establishment of a single sales
joint venture (Nachet) as sole distributor of Sopelem and Vickers
microscopes in the rest of the Common Market, would imply
common price policy and consultation between the parties; and (5)
these provisions would also deprive each party of the possibility of
exercising an independent activity in some member states
(specifically, Sopelem and Vickers should refrain from soliciting
orders in the countries where Nachet or Vickers were exclusive
distributors, which would affect competition in those countries).
The Commission observed that, in view of existing competition
on the relevant market, the effects of the restrictions would be
limited, but still appreciable. Actually, neither Sopelem nor Vickers
were among the largest manufacturers of microscopes, but they
were both economically and technically important companies,
which had now established a cooperation in research and
development. Joint distribution of these microscopes would also
involve standardization of parts and specialized division of these
instruments for which they both had sizeable market shares in their
home countries.
The agreement would affect trade between member states
because: (1) the agreement concerned competing undertakings from
two different member states, which had previously operated
independently on the various Community markets; (2) it covered
research and development, as well as distribution, of products
manufactured in two member states, which were dealt with in trade
between all member states; (3) Nachet, as well as Sopelem itself,
was prevented from actively marketing Sopelem products in Ireland
and the United Kingdom, whereas Vickers was prevented from
marketing'its products in the continental member states of the
Common Market; and (4) as a result, marketing would proceed in
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a different manner than it would have been if the joint distribution
arrangement had not been created.
Despite its anticompetitive effect, an individual exemption was
granted because: (1) the technical cooperation and the exchange of
research expertise and know-how would enable both Sopelem and
Vickers to secure the development and maintenance of a more
comprehensive and technically advanced range of microscopes; (2)
the specialization would enable each party to focus its activity on
those products which would be more adapted to its own experience
and skill; (3) the standardization of components would increase the
possibility of having interchangeable components, and would
reduce costs because it would avoid having identical production
facilities, tools, and machines for the manufacture of the same
components; (4) without the agreement, Sopelem would have
stopped the production of microscopes because of the exorbitant
costs for research and development; (5) by virtue of offering the
possibility of an extended and more comprehensive range of
microscopes, as well as the specialization, the agreement would
allow each party to improve its technical competence and,
therefore, would improve their individual competitive situations
after the termination of the agreement; (6) the distribution system
would enable the parties to increase their own sales and avoid the
high costs necessary to maintain independent distribution networks
in the same country; (7) the efficiency of the distribution system
would be increased because the distributors appointed for the
various countries would be those who previously had the better
sales network and the most well-established business relations; (8)
the after-sales service, which according to the agreement was to be
carried out by the distributor, would be more rational because the
parties could avoid expensive concurrent service organizations in
the same countries; and (9) the technical cooperation would enable
both Sopelem and Vickers to offer a more satisfactory range of
microscopes and services.
The Commission noted that the benefits which would be
available to the consumer would include: (1) the reduction of costs
arising from the unification of their distribution networks and the
specialization and concentration in research and development would
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enable both parties to supply such instruments and after-sales
service at lower costs; (2) the existence in the Common Market of
several technically advanced, larger, and economically stronger
competitors would ensure that the consumers would have a large
part of the advantages of the reduced costs transferred to them; (3)
the technical cooperation, the standardization of the parties'
instruments, and the subsequent greater interchangeability of certain
parts and accessories for the instruments concerned would offer
consumers an increased use of these instruments without increased
purchasing costs because they could add a greater number of
accessories and special devices manufactured by both Sopelem and
Vickers to the standardized instruments in their possession; and (4)
because of the competitiveness, the economic strength, and the
production capacity of their major competitors, Sopelem and
Vickers would be bound to transfer the economic advantages to the
consumer.
It was held that the agreement contained no restrictions on
competition which were unnecessary for the achievement of the
aims pursued by the parties through the joint venture because: (1)
in light of their small market shares and not very competitive
products, both parties found it difficult to achieve sufficient sales
to make a technically sufficient independent distribution system
economical outside their traditional markets; (2) as a consequence,
in order to fully obtain the advantages of the technical cooperation,
it was necessary for the parties to cooperate in sales and
distribution activities and, at the same time, to make sure that a
jointly appointed distributor would be technically competent to
manage the distribution and after-sales service of even the most
complicated instruments; (3) only through joint distribution could
the parties maintain their present positions in the market and to
enter some territories within the Common Market, where their
individual and even combined positions were insignificant; (4) the
restrictive effects of the distribution system on intrabrand
competition and interbrand competition between Sopelem and
Vickers would be minimal, and would be counterbalanced by the
advantages flowing from it because the two parties' microscopes
were far more complementary than competitive; (5) the technical
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cooperation, coordination, and exchange of expertise in research
and development were necessary for Sopelem and Vickers to
maintain a sufficiently comprehensive and continuously competitive
range of microscopes at reasonable costs which would be
competitive with those of Japanese manufacturers in particular, and
also to enable them to maintain and expand their market positions;
and (6) both parent companies would not be prevented from
independently carrying out research and development activities but
would be free to exploit the results of research and development
(both their own and those of the other party) without restriction
after the termination of the agreement.
The Commission observed that neither Sopelem nor Vickers
were among the major manufacturers of microscopes operating in
the Common Market and that the position of German and Japanese
manufacturers would prevent Sopelem and Vickers from
eliminating competition in a substantial portion of the relevant
market.
The Commission noted that, in view of the time necessary to
develop new instruments in this field, the term of the exemption
should be long enough to enable the agreement to produce the
benefits reasonably to be expected therefrom and, therefore, a
period of five years was deemed reasonable.
In view of the general market strength of the undertaking
involved, as well as the nature of the restrictions on competition
flowing from the agreement, the parties are required to send annual
reports to the Commission. These reports should contain all the
information necessary to appraise the operation of the agreement,
its practical results, and its effects on the relevant market, with
particular reference to the maintenance of effective competition
within the EEC. The exemption granted by the decision was
subsequently renewed for a further ten-year period.58
58. Commission Decision of Nov. 26, 1981, 1981 OJ. (L 391) 1.
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XV. CONCLUSION
The Commission's approach to joint ventures under article 85
reflects the goals of its competition policy. Among such goals is
improvement in production and distribution, so that the European
industry can achieve higher standards of efficiency, offering the
consumer more advanced products, at lower prices.
Joint research and development, as well as joint production and
distribution, have been exempted under article 85(3) if, for
instance, a joint venture can make it possible to receive advanced
technology from outside the EEC or if high costs and risks
otherwise involved in independent operations can be avoided.
Standardization of products or components has been considered
to justify an individual exemption if this would offer consumers
interchangeable products. Allocation of production among
competitors has been positively considered if the enterprises
concerned would be able to specialize their respective productions
and reduce costs.
On the other hand, the Commission has considered that
restrictions on competition due to reorganization of activities are
preferable to the maintenance of obsolete, noncompetitive
structures: these structures can only survive through state aid, and
result in an obstacle to the natural development of the market, in
that they prejudice competitors who can rely solely on their own
capacities to remain competitive.
In the above situations, the interest of consumers has always
been a decisive element of the Commission's evaluation, in the
sense that they should benefit, at least in part, from the economic
benefits deriving from the joint venture. Also, the requirement that
the joint venture involve no restrictions on competition which
cannot be considered indispensable for the achievement of the
project, has been carefully evaluated.
Apart from the case in which article 85 does not apply, because
a joint venture is considered to amount to a concentration and
because the parents, definitely withdraw from the joint venture's
market with the likelihood of never returning, cooperation between
undertakings almost inevitably infringes upon article 85. This may
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especially be the case if the creation of a joint venture results in
allocation of markets, restrictions on independent investments or
independent research, restrictions on the possibility of granting
licenses to third parties, coordination of policy, and the like.
After the entry into force of Regulation 4064/89 concerning
concentrations between undertakings, article 85 will continue to
apply if a joint venture has a cooperative character or even if it
should be regarded as a concentration. It involves restrictions of
competition which cannot be considered ancillary to the proposed
operation. To evaluate whether a restriction should be considered
ancillary or, more generally, whether a joint venture should be
regarded as concentrative or cooperative, the analysis of the
Commission's decisions on the application of article 85 to joint
ventures can offer a reliable guide.
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